Licence Appeal Tribunal ·

LAT splits a two-salesperson refusal: Hritani out over falsified credit applications, Danish keeps his registration

Ontario's LAT refused Mahmoud Hritani's salesperson registration over falsified credit applications but let co-appellant Adeel Danish register.

MVDA s. 6(1)(a)(ii) MVDA s. 9(5) MVDA s. 26 MVDA s. 27

Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal decided a joint appeal from two salespersons on July 15, 2026, and sent them in opposite directions. Adeel Danish keeps the path to registration: the Tribunal directed the Registrar not to carry out its proposal to refuse him. Mahmoud Hritani does not: the panel found he falsified a consumer’s credit application and directed the Registrar to carry out the refusal. The decision is published by CanLII as Hritani and Danish v Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2026 CanLII 71314 (ON LAT). It is the first split outcome in the s. 6 appeal cases this site has covered.

One NOP, two records

The Registrar issued a Notice of Proposal on December 15, 2025, proposing to refuse both men’s salesperson registrations. Both grounds ran through s. 6(1)(a)(ii) of the MVDA: past conduct affording reasonable grounds for belief that the applicant will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty. The panel, adjudicators Gurleen Thethi and Caley Howard, heard the appeal by videoconference over three days in late April 2026.

The legal standard came from the Court of Appeal’s Famous Flesh Gordon’s decision (2013 ONCA 157): the Registrar does not have to prove future non-compliance is more likely than not, only that its belief rests on more than mere suspicion and on compelling and credible information, with a nexus to the person’s ability to conduct business under the Act. Following the Divisional Court in Yarco (2024 ONSC 93), the panel framed the question as forward-looking: does the past conduct give reasonable grounds to believe the applicant will fail to conduct business lawfully and honestly in the future?

Why Danish succeeded

Danish had two Consumer Protection Act convictions from March 25, 2025: two counts of engaging in an unfair practice by selling vehicles with deficiencies requiring mechanical repairs, contrary to ss. 14(1) and 17(1) of the CPA, with a $2,000 fine on each. He pleaded guilty. A second set of charges, three counts each under s. 26 and s. 27 of the MVDA plus three CPA counts, remained before the court and stood as allegations only.

The panel accepted that the CPA offences were strict liability and involved no finding of intent or dishonesty, while still treating the guilty pleas as evidence of a failure to ensure compliance. What tipped the balance was the falsification evidence, or rather its absence. Two consumers testified that their credit applications carried inflated incomes, but both said their dealings were primarily with people other than Danish. The dealership owner’s evidence was second-hand. The OMVIC investigator conceded his conclusions rested on information from others rather than direct proof. The emails and lead records in the hearing record did not identify Danish as their author. His role, the panel accepted, was largely limited to signing the “vendor acceptance” section of bills of sale.

The panel also credited Danish’s testimony that he left the dealership because its owners’ decisions did not align with his commitment to operating ethically. That choice, it held at para [13], “undermines, rather than supports” a finding that the misconduct would repeat. On the whole record, the evidence against him did not rise above mere suspicion, and the Registrar was directed not to carry out the NOP against him.

Why Hritani failed

Hritani’s record looked different. He pleaded guilty on March 25, 2025 to one count of furnishing false information and documents under s. 27 of the MVDA and was fined $1,500. The panel held at para [35] that “a guilty plea and a conviction for furnishing false information” is exactly the kind of compelling and credible evidence the test contemplates, in an offence with a direct nexus to trading in vehicles.

Then came the consumer evidence. Ms. Young, a purchaser receiving ODSP, child benefits, and limited income from a small side business, testified that she was candid about her finances, dealt primarily with Hritani, and was rushed through electronic signing on a brief video call. Her credit application told a different story: an income at least double her real earnings, employment at a company she had no connection to, and rental figures that did not exist. When she discovered the numbers and called the dealership about payments she could not afford, she was told the deal could not be reversed. The panel found her consistent and credible, and found at para [47], on a balance of probabilities, that Hritani falsified the documents: he was the salesperson handling the sale, and her testimony about his involvement went unchallenged. Hritani attended the hearing self-represented but neither testified nor called evidence.

A further set of charges against Hritani, two counts each under s. 26 and s. 27 plus two CPA counts, remained before the court at the time of the hearing and are allegations only. OMVIC’s court enforcement table separately records a June 26, 2026 trial conviction of Mahmoud Hritani under s. 27 with 12 months of probation, noted in the June and July court convictions roundup.

No conditions this time

Under s. 9(5) of the MVDA the Tribunal could have substituted conditions for refusal, as it did in Pourtehrani and Jandu. Hritani made no submissions proposing any. The panel went further than resting on that silence: it held at paras [54] to [55] that conditions such as supervision or additional training could not protect the public, because the proven conduct was a pattern rather than a single incident, and falsifying financing information “exposes vulnerable consumers to significant financial risk and undermines the integrity of the marketplace.” The refusal was carried out.

The pending charges against both men have yet to be decided, and the Tribunal’s decision itself is not necessarily the last word: Divisional Court review remains open to either party.

What to learn

  • The s. 6(1)(a)(ii) test is personal, not guilt by dealership. Danish worked at the same store where falsification occurred, but the Registrar could not link him to preparing or submitting the false numbers, so suspicion was all that remained. Compare Olschewski, where the Registrar’s case also failed on the link between conduct and future risk.
  • A falsified credit application is close to unanswerable. A s. 27 conviction plus one credibly proven falsified application was enough to defeat registration outright, without conditions even being considered viable.
  • Strict-liability convictions carry less weight than dishonesty offences. The panel accepted that CPA unfair-practice pleas showed a compliance failure, but without mens rea they did not, on their own, establish the forward-looking risk the test requires.